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Tom	 Torrance’s	 name	 will	 probably	 be	 recalled	 in	 the	 history	 of	
theology	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 title	 of	 the	 book	 by	which	 he	was	 best	
known	 during	 his	 career:	 Theological Science.	Alongside	 this	 one	
needs	 to	put	 his	 role	 in	 founding	 the	Scottish Journal of Theology,	
and	of	editing	the	English	translation	of	the	Church Dogmatics,	but	it	
can	be	assumed	that	his	award	of	a	Fellowship	of	the	British	Academy	
was	 due	 above	 all	 to	 the	 publication	 of	 what	 must	 surely	 rank	 as	
his	magnum opus.	Leaving	aside	his	 stimulating	essays	on	patristic	
theology,	Theological Science set	the	agenda	for	a	prolific	stream	of	
later	books	and	articles.
When	I	read	for	a	BD	at	New	College	from	1974–77	I	used	to	think	
that	 these	articles	could	be	a	 little	repetitious,	and	I	 looked	forward	
to	more	writing	 upon	 the	 substantial	 themes	 of	Christian	Doctrine.	
Such	thoughts	remain	with	me,	to	a	degree,	and	I	warmly	welcome	the	
publication	of	Tom	Torrance’s	 central	 course	 in	Christian	Doctrine,	
which	I	only	partly	heard	at	first	hand,	because	of	the	leave	of	absence	
which	he	 took	 from	 the	University,	when	he	was	Moderator	 of	 the	
General	Assembly.	This	new	book	is	a	superb	addition	to	his	published	
writings.
Tom	 Torrance’s	 death,	 and	 the	 consequent	 invitation	 to	 write	
obituaries	and	appreciations,	and	to	speak	at	this	conference,	took	me	
back	to	Theological Science	itself.	When	I	first	read	it,	in	the	first	year	
of	my	BD	I	think,	I	found	it	a	difficult	book	with	which	to	engage.	I	
know	others	have	frequently	found	it	a	hard	read,	partly	because	of	
the	style,	but	more,	I	 think,	due	to	the	underlying	argument	itself.	I	
remember	TF	remarking	 to	me	 that	Michael	Polanyi	had	found	 it	a	
difficult	book,	and	more	recently	Sir	Bernard	Lovell,	a	long-standing	
resident	 and	 church	 organist	 in	 my	 diocese,	 has	 said	 the	 same	 to	
me.	They	did	not	find	 the	book	difficult	 because	 the	 argument	was	
intrinsically	 hard	 to	 follow	 –	 they	 were	 among	 the	 most	 brilliant	
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scientists	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 –	 but,	 I	 would	 suggest,	 because	
the	central	argument	of	the	book	cut	so	sharply	across	the	popularly	
perceived	stream	of	twentieth-century	theological	writings.	The	same	
could	be	said,	of	course,	of	Karl	Barth,	with	whom	Tom	Torrance	felt	
such	a	close	kinship,	amid	their	very	different	personalities.
When	I	re-read	Theological Science this	summer	I	found	myself	
reacting	in	a	quite	different	way	from	the	first	reading,	thirty-five	years	
earlier.	 Strangely,	 despite	 the	 general	 addling	 of	 my	 brain	 through	
age	and	the	neglect	of	intellectual	activity	which	is	a	bishop’s	lot,	I	
found	 it	 a	 comparatively	 easy	 read.	Why	might	 this	 have	 been	 the	
case?	Perhaps	my	mind	is	now	so	far	addled	that	the	argument	simply	
went	over	the	top	of	my	head.	I	can’t	rule	this	out,	but	I	would	like	
to	offer	an	alternative	suggestion,	 that	with	the	passage	of	 time	and	
especially	an	additional	thirty-five	years	of	Christian	discipleship	and	
thirty	years	of	Christian	ministry,	 the	book	 simply	made	better	 and	
more	ready	sense	to	me	as	compared	with	my	youth.
The	key	to	Theological Science,	as	I	now	see	it,	lies	in	the	Preface:
If	I	may	be	allowed	to	speak	personally	for	a	moment,	I	find	the	
presence	and	being	of	God	bearing	upon	my	experience	and	
thought	so	powerfully	 that	 I	cannot	but	be	convinced	of	His	
overwhelming	reality	and	rationality.	To	doubt	the	existence	of	
God	would	be	an	act	of	sheer	irrationality,	for	it	would	mean	
that	my	reason	had	become	unhinged	from	its	bond	with	real	
being.	(p.	ix)1
I	would	relate	this	to	Tom	Torrance’s	statement	in	his	autobiographical	
note	that	throughout	his	life	he	could	recite	in	Mandarin	Chinese	the	
rhyme	 ‘Jesus	 loves	me	 this	 I	know,	 for	 the	Bible	 tells	me	so’.	 It	 is	
easy	 to	 forget	 that	 it	was	only	as	a	 teenager	 that	he	 left	China,	and	
the	mission	 school	 in	which	 he	 had	 been	 educated,	 for	 the	 critical	
fleshpots	of	Europe.	For	Tom	Torrance,	belief	in	God	was	as	natural	
an	 assumption	 as	 the	 belief	 which	 today’s	 scientists	 have	 that	 the	
world	of	nature	is	open	to	rational	investigation:	that	if	an	experiment	
is	 conducted	 on	Monday	 there	 is	 a	 safe	 assumption,	 so	 safe	 that	 it	
does	not	even	need	to	be	explicitly	stated	or	recognised,	that	the	same	
experiment	later	in	the	week	will	yield	the	same	result,	all	other	things	
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being	equal.	The	world	in	which	he	had	been	brought	up	was	a	pre-
Cartesian,	pre-Kantian	world,	in	which	it	was	more	natural	to	doubt	
one’s	own	existence	than	the	existence	of	God.
It	is	this	theme	which	is	explored	at	length,	and	with	considerable	
intellectual	energy,	 in	Theological Science.	The	book	ends	with	 the	
trenchant	statement	–	the	word	‘claim’	would	seem	too	weak:
It	 must	 not	 be	 forgotten	 that	 the	 sole	 Object	 of	 dogmatic	
statements	 is	 the	 Datum	 of	 divine	 Revelation	 which	 does	
not	cease	to	be	God’s	own	Being	and	Act	in	His	Self-giving,	
and	therefore	is	not	something	that	passes	over	into	the	inner	
spiritual	states	of	the	Church’s	experience	or	into	its	historical	
consciousness	and	subjectivity.	(p.	351)
To	describe	God’s	revelation	of	himself	as	a	‘Datum’	raises	all	sorts	of	
questions,	of	course.	They	are	most	directly	addressed	in	the	central	
chapter	in	the	book,	entitled	“The	Nature	of	Truth”.	For	TF	there	can	
be	no	reduction	of	truth	to	ideas,	or	to	linguistic	statements	of	ideas.	
Theological	truth,	in	Christian	terms,	can	only	be	identified	with	God	
himself,	in	his	self-revelation	in	Jesus	Christ:	‘I	am	the	way,	the	truth,	
and	the	life’.	As	such,	Christian	knowledge	of	God	has	a	sacramental	
character,	in	which:
[…]	visible	and	 invisible,	 audible	and	 inaudible,	 earthly	and	
heavenly,	 the	human	and	 the	divine,	are	held	 together	 in	 the	
unity	of	the	self-communication	of	the	Truth	of	God	to	us	and	
of	our	communion	with	that	Truth.	(p.	149)
Tom	Torrance	is	not	afraid	to	use	the	language	of	mystery,	echoing	the	
New	Testament	origins	of	sacramental	theology:	Christian	truth	takes	
the	form	of	a	mystery,	that	is	the	form	of	‘a	concrete	fact	or	particular	
event	 to	which	nevertheless	 the	Truth	 is	 infinitely	 transcendent’	 (p.	
149).	Knowledge	of	the	Truth	of	Revelation	therefore	needs	to	take	
the	form	which	the	Truth	itself	dictates:
It	 is	 not	 known	 timelessly	 as	 the	 necessary	 truths	 of	 reason	
are	known,	nor	is	it	known	only	historically	as	other	historical	
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events	are	known,	but	known	according	to	its	two-fold	nature	
as	 eternal	 and	 historical,	 as	 the	movement	 of	 the	 eternal	 in	
time,	 a	movement	 that	 takes	 our	 time	 seriously,	 and	 has	 for	
ever	taken	it	up,	sanctified	and	healed,	into	union	with	itself.	
(p.	152)
In	 the	 New	 College	 Dogmatics	 course,	 as	 in	 Theological Science	
itself,	 Kierkegaard’s	Philosophical Fragments	 was	 used	 to	 support	
this	historico-transcendent	view	of	the	true	object	–	and	subject	–	of	
theology.	 Elsewhere	Torrance	 speaks	 of	 the	 two-fold	 objectivity	 of	
God,	the	ultimate	objectivity	of	God	who	comes	to	us	clothed	in	his	
proximate	 objectivity,	making	 himself	 known	 only	 as	 he	 stoops	 to	
take	 the	 form	of	a	 servant	within	 the	 structured	objectivities	of	our	
world.	This	engenders	a	‘baffling	element	in	theological	knowledge,	
the	bi-polarity	or	bi-focality	of	its	truth-reference’	(p.	298),	which	is	
an	inevitable	consequence	of	the	unique	nature	of	God	and	the	way	in	
which	he	has	chosen	to	reveal	himself.
Our	 knowledge	 of	 God	 therefore	 requires	 a	 special	 act	 of	
discernment,	in	a	mode	of	rationality	which	reflects	the	distinctive	and	
unique	character	of	God’s	revelation	of	himself.	This	has	commonly	
been	called	faith,	which,	for	Torrance,	simply	means	the	fidelity	of the 
human reason	to	what	is	actually	there	in	an	encounter	with	God	in	
the	intersection	of	his	historical	revelation	with	our	personal	histories.	
Our	knowledge	of	God	is	thus	inseparable	from	God’s	knowledge	of	
us,	 and	 indeed	God’s	 knowledge	 of	 us	 has	 a	 precedence:	 ‘Ye	 have	
not	chosen	me,	but	I	have	chosen	you’.	‘Herein	is	love,	not	that	we	
loved	God	but	that	he	loved	us’.	Tom	Torrance	was	fond	of	quoting	
these	verses,	along	with	St	Paul’s	repeated	‘Ye	know	God,	or	rather	
are	 known	 of	 God’.	 This	 gives	 rise	 to	 what	 Torrance	 called	 an	
‘epistemological	inversion’	in	our	knowledge	of	God.
These	themes,	and	this	thesis,	are	explored	at	length	in	Theological 
Science,	with	much	attention	to	detailed	points	of	 logic,	and	on	my	
recent	re-reading	it	all	fell	 into	place	much	more	easily	that	I	recall	
was	 the	 case	 when	 I	 first	 read	 it.	 I	 would	 identify	 two	 underlying	
reasons	for	this.	
The	first	takes	me	back	to	my	own	conversion	to	Christ,	which	in	
retrospect	I	would	describe	as	follows.	As	a	grammar	school	boy,	the	
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first	generation	of	my	family	to	go	to	university,	I	arrived	in	Oxford	in	
1969	to	study	Chemistry,	with	little	Christian	commitment,	although	
I	should	not	underestimate	the	subliminal	significance	of	my	parents	
underlying,	 and	 tacit,	 Christian	 faith.	The	 questions	 ‘what	was	 life	
about?’,	and	‘was	there	any	ultimate	meaning	in	the	universe?’	were	
questions	which	came	naturally	to	me.	One	option,	fashionable	in	the	
late	1960s	if	in	a	less	strident	form	than	that	which	is	adopted	by	some	
Oxford	 scientists	 today,	 would	 have	 been	 atheism	 or	 agnosticism.	
Agnosticism	is	hardly	an	answer	at	all,	and	atheism	appeared	to	me	
to	be	 intrinsically	unlikely.	To	 look	at	 our	world,	 and	 the	universe,	
in	all	its	splendour,	complexity,	and	evident	rationality	and	conclude	
that	 there	was	no	ultimate	explanation	of	 it,	and	source	of	meaning	
outside	 the	 universe	 itself	 just	 seemed	 unlikely.	 I	 have	 sometimes	
put	it	as	follows,	especially	when	I	have	had	the	opportunity	to	talk	
with	 scientists	 and	 intellectuals	 who	 profess	 atheism:	 ‘I	 just	 don’t	
have	enough	faith	to	be	an	atheist’.	This,	I	think	helps	to	explain	the	
residual	theism	of	the	great	majority	of	British	people	today,	despite	
the	practical	agnosticism	which	they	seem	to	display,	and	which	many	
cultural	pundits	in	our	society	regularly	commend.
An	 alternative	 to	 atheism	 or	 agnosticism	 would	 have	 been	 a	
conventional	or	deistic	belief	 that	 the	world	had	 a	 creator,	who	we	
might	be	able	to	some	degree	to	know,	but	who	remained	essentially	
separate	 from	 the	 universe	 and	 our	 experience	 in	 it.	 The	Masonic	
‘Great	Architect’	of	the	world	in	his	–	or	its	–	various	guises,	including	
the	pantheistic	versions	with	their	ancient	pagan	pedigrees.	But	this	
seemed	unlikely	too,	because	alongside	the	regularity	and	rationality	
of	the	world	went	its	sin	and	suffering,	its	evil	and	emptiness.	If	God	
was	 indeed	 a	 cosmic	watchmaker,	 endowed	with	 the	 unimaginable	
power	which	had	enabled	him	to	create	the	universe	in	the	first	place,	
wouldn’t	he	have	made	the	watch	to	run	better	to	time?	For	me,	the	
‘Great	Architect’	didn’t	add	up,	any	more	than	atheism.
At	 Oxford,	 largely	 influenced	 by	 some	 Scottish	 postgraduate	
students,	I	encountered	a	third	option,	the	classic	Christian	view,	that	
the	world	had	been	created	out	of	nothing	by	a	divine	Creator,	who	
had	become	incarnate	within	the	world,	 in	a	mysterious	way	loving	
and	redeeming	it	from	within,	to	the	point	of	death	on	the	Cross,	and	
the	 final	 conquest	 of	 death	 itself	 in	 the	Resurrection.	At	 one	 level,	
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this	was	 absurd	 and	unbelievable,	 just	 as	 the	 educated	despisers	 of	
Christianity	 had	 asserted	 in	 the	 early	 patristic	 centuries.	To	 them	–	
Celsus	 and	 company	 –	Christianity	 looked	 like	 a	 throwback	 to	 the	
age	of	the	Graeco-Roman	myths	of	Gods	and	their	offspring	visiting	
the	earth.	Christians	were	first	called	Christians	at	Antioch,	of	course,	
much	as	we	might	refer	to	‘Moonies’	today	–	followers	of	an	absurd	
and	potentially	rather	dangerous	sect.	Yet	at	another	level	Christianity	
in	 its	classical	 form	made	more	 ‘sense’	 to	me	 than	either	 the	belief	
that	there	is	no	God,	or	the	belief	that	there	is	a	conventional,	deistic,	
distant	or	for	that	matter	immanent	God.	It	made	more	sense	because	
it	 brought	 together	 both	 the	 belief	 in	 creation,	 the	 regularity	 and	
rationality	of	the	world,	and	the	belief	in	salvation	or	redemption	in	a	
world	of	sin,	suffering	and	death.	Yet	the	sense	it	made	of	everything	
was	a	mysterious,	incomplete,	almost	counter-intuitive	sense,	which	
could	only	be	affirmed	 in	 faith,	and	which,	 from	other	perspectives	
might	indeed	attract	the	ridicule	and	contempt	which	is	having	a	noisy	
resurgence	today.	Nevertheless,	as	notably	argued	by	Barth	and	von	
Balthasar,	Christian	truth	emerges	beautiful,	precisely	because	of	its	
mysterious,	counter-intuitive	character.
When	I	first	read	Theological Science	 it	began	to	make	sense	of	
my	experience,	but	in	a	rather	fragmented	way.	Thirty-five	years	on	
things	had	fallen	much	more	into	place,	as	my	Christian	faith	has	been	
tested	and	refined	along	life’s	journey.	The	reservation	would	perhaps	
be	that	in	defending	the	rationality	of	classical	Christianity	one	also	
needs	 to	 acknowledge	 its	 counter-intuitive,	 mysterious	 aspect,	 its	
foolishness	 to	 the	Greeks,	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 treat	 gently	 those	
who	 one	 perceives	 are	 still	 Greeks.	As	 Einstein	 used	 to	 say,	 in	 an	
expression	which	Tom	Torrance	often	repeated,	God	doesn’t	wear	his	
heart	on	his	sleeve,	but	all	the	more	reason	for	resisting	a	temptation	
to	try	to	force	the	logic	of	the	Gospel	upon	folk,	or	to	designate	those	
who	do	not	yet	have	a	mature	Christian	commitment.	We	need	to	be	
ready	to	account	for	the	hope	that	is	in	us,	‘yet	do	it	with	gentleness	
and	reverence’	(1	Peter	3:15).
The	 second	 reason	 for	my	much	easier	 adoption	of	 the	position	
advocated	 in	 Theological Science	 relates	 more	 directly	 to	 my	
experience	in	Christian	ministry,	and	especially	to	the	last	dozen	years	
as	 a	 bishop.	There	 are	 around	360	 congregations	 in	 the	Diocese	of	
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Chester,	and	I	typically	visit	each	one	on	a	Sunday	every	four	or	five	
years.	At	a	given	service,	it	is	likely	that	most	of	those	present	have	
not	heard	me	preach,	or	not	for	some	years,	and	for	many	it	will	be	the	
only	time	I	will	have	the	opportunity	to	proclaim	Christ.	This	has	the	
effect	of	concentrating	the	mind	on	what	I	wish	to	say.
At	the	end	of	the	day,	what	really	matters	to	me	about	the	Christian	
faith?	In	today’s	cultural	contexts,	what	do	I	most	want	to	get	across?	
This	 is	 a	 very	 practical	 question,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	my	ministry.	
The	answer,	which	has	emerged	quite	naturally	in	the	exercise	of	my	
ministry,	rather	than	by	analysis	or	design,	is	that	one	way	or	another	
I	try	to	concentrate	upon	what	I	have	come	to	see	as	at	the	centre	of	
the	Christian	faith,	the	belief	that	Christian	experience	radiates	from	
a	recognition	that	one	is	a	child	of	God,	and	that	one	belongs	to	Jesus	
Christ	as	intrinsically	part	of	his	very	Body,	the	Church.	‘Belonging’	
undergirds	and	generally	precedes	‘believing’	or	‘behaving’.	That,	 I	
think,	 is	why	 the	 description	 of	 a	Christian	 as	 an	 adopted	 child	 of	
God	is	so	central	in	the	New	Testament,	developing	the	image	of	the	
people	of	Israel	as	children	of	the	covenant.	We	easily	overlook	today	
the	pervasiveness	in	the	Bible	of	the	description	of	God	as	Father.	We	
have	become	so	used	to	praying	to	‘Our	Father’	that	we	have	readily	
come	to	miss	its	deep	and	radical	significance.	If	God	regards	us	as	
his	adopted	sons	and	daughters,	co-heirs	with	Christ,	will	he	not	treat	
his	adopted	children	as	every	bit	as	important	to	him,	special	to	him,	
loved	by	him,	as	is	Jesus,	his,	if	you	like,	‘natural	born	Son’?	We	are	
told	 that	God	 shows	 no	 partiality,	 but	we	 have	 too	 easily	 confined	
that	 to	 a	 comparison	between	 Jews	and	Gentiles,	 etc.	 In	 fact	 it	 has	
a	more	radical	significance.	We	share	Jesus’	 rights	and	entitlements	
as	members	of	the	original	Royal	Family	–	by	grace,	but	not	in	any	
second	class	way.	God	has	fought	for	us,	and	died	for	us	–	no	cheap	
grace	 there.	The	emphasis	given	 to	 the	 language	of	 the	Fatherhood	
of	God,	and	the	essential	sonship	of	Christians,	in	nineteenth-century	
liberal	theology	has	led	to	its	neglect	by	more	conservative	theological	
traditions,	but	it	is	central	to	the	witness	of	the	Bible.
But	isn’t	this	precisely	the	starting	point	which	Tom	Torrance	set	
out	in	Theological Science?	Just	as	a	child	grows	up	unquestionably	
with	 a	 sense	 of	 belonging	 to	 his	 or	 her	 particular	 human	 family,	
isn’t	 it	 just	a	natural	expression	of	a	mature	Christian	experience	to	
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speak	in	similar	terms	of	being	aware	of	being	a	child	of	God?	This	
is	no	hubristic	or	fideistic	arrogance,	but	 the	basis	 for	all	 reflection	
upon	the	science	of	the	logic	of	God,	which	is	theology.	As	I	re-read	
Theological Science	 I	was	 struck	 by	 its	 enduring	 relevance	 for	 the	
Church,	and	the	connection	it	made	between	theological	reflection	and	
authentic	Christian	experience.
I	would	like	to	use	the	remaining	sections	of	this	paper	to	discuss	
briefly	some	specific	aspects	of	Tom	Torrance’s	understanding	of	the	
relation	 between	 theology	 and	 modern	 science,	 which	 are	 mainly	
explored	in	later	articles	and	monographs.
Part	of	the	argument	of	Theological Science	and	the	related	later	
books	and	articles	adduce	support	from	the	development	 in	modern	
physics	 from	Newton	 to	 Einstein,	 and	 subsequent	 developments	 in	
the	thermodynamics	of	open	systems,	so-called	chaos	theory.	I	have	
always	 regarded	his	 argument	 as	basically	 sound,	 and	 I	have	never	
doubted	that	Tom	Torrance	had	acquired	an	impressive	understanding	
of	 the	 relevant	science.	Voices	have	occasionally	been	raised	 to	 the	
contrary,	including	in	some	obituaries	with	an	unnecessarily	dyspeptic	
tone.	Prophets	not	occasionally	achieve	only	limited	honour	in	their	
own	land,	and	the	criticisms	on	this	front	which	I	have	heard	have	arisen	
mainly	from	within	Scotland,	and	indeed	the	Church	of	Scotland.	Had	
they	been	soundly	based,	the	British	Academy	would	not	have	granted	
Tom	Torrance	the	considerable	honour	of	a	Fellowship.	Sir	Bernard	
Lovell	has	recently	said	to	me	how	well	versed	Tom	Torrance	became	
in	modern	physics.
The	 key	 point	 which	 Torrance	 recognised	 was	 that	 the	 move	
from	Newton	to	Einstein	allowed	the	world	to	unburden	itself	of	the	
immanent	divinity	which	infinite	and	absolute	co-ordinates	of	space	
and	time	implied.	After	Einstein	space	and	time	are	related	and	relative	
to	each	other,	held	 together	by	 the	 invariance	of	 the	speed	of	 light.	
Modern	cosmology,	Big	Bang	and	all,	is	an	outworking	of	Einstein’s	
foundational	 theories,	 and	permits	us	 to	 speak	 in	new	ways	of	 ‘the	
universe’	or	‘creation’	as	intelligible	concepts.	The	older	Newtonian	
view	regarded	the	universe	as	infinite,	and	it	is	difficult	to	maintain	a	
discrete	concept	of	that	which	is	infinite.	After	Einstein,	the	universe	
is	regarded	as	finite	if	unbounded.
The	area	 in	which	I	 found	Torrance’s	 insights	here	most	helpful	
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was	in	his	restatement	of	some	fundamental	aspects	of	incarnational	
and	sacramental	theology,	especially	in	Space, Time and Incarnation.	
In	this	elegant	little	book	Torrance	shows	how	the	movement	of	God	
into	time	and	space,	and	his	overall	interaction	with	time	and	space,	
can	only	be	understood	out	of	its	own	equivalent	to	Einstein’s	theory	of	
the	field	of	gravitational	space-time.	That	is,	just	as	events	in	modern	
physics	 cannot	 be	 understood	 apart	 from	 a	 holistic	 understanding	
of	 how	 space	 and	 time	 relate	 to	 the	 events	 which	 they	 comprise,	
including	the	perspective	of	the	observer,	so	too	God’s	presence	in	the	
world,	by	whatever	mode,	can	only	be	expressed	by	reference	to	the	
distinctive	dynamics	of	his	presence.	History	 is	not	an	 independent	
‘receptacle’	 into	which	the	pre-existent	Christ	might	parachute	(and	
with	which,	in	an	infinite	world,	he	might	compete),	and	neither	are	
the	water	of	baptism	or	the	bread	and	wine	of	 the	Lord’s	Supper	to	
be	 regarded	 as	 mere	 stages	 or	 receptacles	 for	 God’s	 presence	 and	
activity.	Such	a	view	leads	to	the	dialectic	of	either	mere	receptionism,	
usually	associated	with	Zwingli,	or	to	a	mistaken	physicalism,	usually	
associated	with	a	certain	stream	of	older	Roman	Catholic	 theology.	
For	TF,	any	approach	to	incarnational	or	sacramental	theology	which	
attempts	 to	 relate	 God’s	 presence	 extrinsically	 to	 pre-conceived	
understandings	of	history	or	nature	would	 inevitably	end	 in	 serious	
error.	An	 interesting	 example	 is	 provided	 by	Newton	 himself,	who	
wrote	extensively	upon	theological	issues.	He	sided	with	Arius	against	
Athanasius	because	 in	a	Newtonian	scheme	it	was	easier	 to	see	 the	
incarnate	Christ	as	created.	In	a	similar	way,	Torrance	was	reluctant	
to	think	that	the	atonement	could	be	understood	by	reference	to	one	
or	more	 abstract	 ‘theories	of	 the	 atonement’,	 rather	 than	out	 of	 the	
whole	mystery	of	the	atonement	itself.	The	consequent	rejection	of	the	
theory	of	penal	substitution,	as	developed	and	stated	in	some	strands	
of	medieval,	Reformation,	and	especially	post-Reformation	theology	
brought	 Tom	Torrance	 into	 a	 rather	 sharp	 conflict	 with	 some	New	
College	students,	and	regrettably	soured	his	relationship	with	Scottish	
conservative	evangelicalism	 in	general.	Later	 in	his	 life,	 thankfully,	
these	relationships	saw	a	measure	of	healing.
Tom	 Torrance	 drew	 an	 interesting	 analogy	 between	 the	 role	
in	 physics	 of	 light	 with	 its	 invariant	 speed,	 and	 the	 place	 of	 the	
homoousion	and	hypostatic	union	–	the	divinity	and	humanity	of	Christ	
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–	in	theology.	Both	were	to	be	seen	as	universal	constants,	established	
by	God’s	grace	and	will,	each	to	be	understood	sui generis out	of	their	
own	logic,	lodged	deep	in	the	heart	of	God’s	purposes	in	creation	and	
redemption.	In	the	case	of	Christ	this	invariance	and	mystery	is	that	of	
God’s	own	Person,	with	an	uncreated	logic	and	rationality.
My	own	judgement	was	and	is	 that	Tom	Torrance	was	basically	
right	in	his	approach	to	the	theology	of	the	incarnation	and	atonement,	
and	 sacramental	 theology.	 My	 hesitation	 is	 that	 he	 never	 broke	
sufficiently	free	from	certain	aspects	of	Calvin’s	theology:	in	defending	
too	uncritically	Calvin’s	doctrine	of	God,	with	its	unresolved	tension	
between	the	wrath	and	the	love	of	God,	and	therefore	in	not	embracing	
more	clearly	Barth’s	reconstruction	of	Calvin’s	theology	of	election,	
and	in	failing	to	relate	his	sacramental	theology	of	Baptism	and	the	
Lord’s	 Supper	 to	 the	 presence	 of	God	 to	 all	 times	 and	 places.	Yet,	
despite	 what	 I	 have	 come	 to	 regard	 as	 certain	 limitations	 in	 Tom	
Torrance’s	 theological	 framework,	which,	 if	you	 like,	 I	would	have	
preferred	to	be	rather	more	Barthian	and	somewhat	less	Calvinistic,	
the	basic	direction	of	his	relating	of	theology	to	the	modern	scientific	
revolution	in	our	understanding	of	space	and	time	was	absolutely	on	
the	right	track.
Tom	Torrance	drew	from	Einstein	the	belief	that	in	all	spheres	of	
knowledge	there	needed	to	be	a	new	understanding	of	how	theoretical	
and	empirical	aspects	of	knowledge	were	related,	and	in	particular	he	
built	upon	Einstein’s	own	striking	account	of	the	inter-dependence	of	
mathematics	and	physics.	Just	as	 in	science	 there	was	no	 logical	or	
deductive	relationship	between	theoretical	models	and	the	facts	which	
supported	them,	so	theological	formulations	had	to	bear	an	open	and	
revisable	relationship	to	God	himself,	and	to	the	evidence,	scriptural	
and	otherwise,	upon	which	theology	rests.
Einstein’s	account	of	 the	 role	of	 intuition	 in	scientific	discovery	
was	 taken	 much	 further	 by	 the	 scientist-philosopher	 Michael	
Polanyi.	 Torrance	 and	 Polanyi	 became	 good	 friends,	 and	 Torrance	
was	appointed	by	Polanyi	 to	be	his	 literary	executor.	Again,	by	my	
judgement	 Torrance	made	 creative	 and	 fair	 use	 of	 Polanyi’s	 work,	
and	 helped	 to	 express	Polanyi’s	 thought	 in	 a	 rather	 clearer	 relation	
to	 other	 philosophers	 of	 science	 than	 Polanyi	 himself	 was	 able	 to	
do.	 I	 regard	 Tom	Torrance’s	 essay	 “The	 Place	 of	Michael	 Polanyi	
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in	the	Modern	Philosophy	of	Science”2	as	among	his	most	brilliant.	
Just	 as	Torrance	 himself	 regarded	 theology	 as	 the	 extension	 of	 the	
instinctive,	 intuitive	 knowledge	 of	 God	 to	 which	 his	 parents	 had	
introduced	him,	so	Polanyi	presented	the	whole	range	of	the	human	
quest	for	knowledge,	including	empirical	science,	as	a	great	extension	
of	the	perception	by	which	children	learn	to	see	the	world,	and	to	find	
their	place	in	it.	For	both	Polanyi	and	Torrance	this	implied	a	united	
epistemology	and	ontology	in	which	the	usual	dialectic	of	subject	and	
object	is	transcended,	not	by	any	relapse	into	subjectivism,	but	by	the	
recognition	of	a	much	deeper,	mysterious,	multi-levelled	objectivity	
in	all	that	we	know,	and	of	which	we	are	an	intrinsic	part,	intuitively	
linked	 to	 the	God	 in	whom	we	 live	 and	move	and	have	our	being,	
whose	knowledge	of	us	precedes	and	establishes	our	knowledge	of	
him.
Michael	 Polanyi	 chose	 to	 establish	 his	 philosophy	 without	 any	
necessary	 reference	 to	 God,	 although	 he	made	 his	 broad	 Christian	
sympathies	clear.	The	creativity	 in	Tom	Torrance’s	appropriation	of	
him	was	in	drawing	out	the	potential	correlation	of	Polanyi’s	work	with	
Christian	theology,	although	it	was	not	 the	only	form	of	correlation	
which	scholars	have	put	forward.	The	more	one	bases	an	epistemology	
upon	a	non-foundational	 act	of	perception	or	 recognition,	 the	more	
open	one	needs	to	be	to	the	possible	falsehood	of	that	original	intuition,	
and	 the	more	sympathetic	 towards	 those	who	see	 things	differently.	
This	wasn’t	always	Tom	Torrance’s	greatest	strength,	as	even	his	most	
ardent	supporter	would	admit.	Even	if	others	are	mainly	wrong,	they	
will	often	be	partly	right,	and	in	even	in	their	mistakenness	they	will	
often	draw	attention	to	the	weaker	aspect	of	one’s	own	position	and	
commitments.
Tom	Torrance’s	tendency	towards	being	somewhat	impatient	with	
those	with	whom	 he	 disagreed	 should	 not	 be	 overstated,	 and	went	
alongside	 a	 deep	 and	 sympathetic	 humanity,	 but	 it	 can	 perhaps	 be	
related	to	the	point	where	I	consider	his	assessment	of	the	link	between	
theology	and	natural	 science	was	at	 its	weakest.	He	could	speak	of	
developments	in	modern	science	as	if	they	were	the	last	word,	rather	
than	an	improved	word,	on	what	had	gone	before.	Who	knows	what	
further	developments	there	may	yet	be	in	cosmology	and	theoretical	
physics?
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In	a	similar	vein,	Tom	Torrance	could	speak	of	aspects	of	Christian	
doctrine	 with	 a	 greater	 certainty	 than	 may	 be	 appropriate.	 ‘Lord	 I	
believe’	always	needs	 the	complementary	 ‘Help	 thou	my	unbelief’.	
The	 tendencies	 to	 over-emphasise	 the	 certainties	 of	 our	 knowledge	
in	science	and	in	theology	is	illustrated	by	his	discussion	of	created	
and	 uncreated	 light	 in	 various	 places,	most	 notably	 in	 a	 chapter	 in	
Christian Theology and Scientific Culture.3	 Here	 he	 leans	 heavily	
upon	the	patristic	use	of	the	concept	of	God	as	light,	but	this	is	a	point	
where	the	Church	Fathers	exhibit	the	limitations	of	their	pre-scientific	
cultural	 setting,	 and	 are	 drawn	 to	 assert	 that	 the	 orderliness	 of	 the	
universe,	 and	 the	 power	 of	 the	 sun’s	 light,	 are	 direct	 reflections	 of	
God’s	illumination	of	all	things.	They	found	it	hard	fully	to	maintain	
what	Torrance	would	elsewhere	call	the	contingent	rationality	of	the	
created	world.	He	tries	to	uphold	a	clear	distinction	between	created	
and	uncreated	light,	but	slips	into	asserting	too	close	a	parallel	between	
them,	 and	makes	mistaken	 claims	 about	 the	 inherent	 invisibility	 of	
created	light:
If	we	commonly	speak	of	light	as	‘visible’,	it	is	not	because	it	
really	is,	but	because	the	human	eye	is	adapted	to	see,	not	the	
radiation	itself,	but	its	effect	in	lighting	up	whatever	reflects	it.4
This	is	inaccurate,	because	we	do	see	light	directly,	within	the	range	
of	frequency	which	we	call	‘the	visible	spectrum’,	that	is,	the	range	
of	 frequencies	 to	which	 our	 retina	 is	 sensitive.	Other	 animals	 have	
a	different	range,	so	bees	see	what	to	humans	are	white	flowers	in	a	
range	of	‘colours’.	There	may	be	a	certain	analogy	between	created	
and	 uncreated	 light,	 but	 the	 differences	 are	 greater	 than	 Torrance	
allowed.	Arguably,	this	went	along	more	generally	with	an	insufficient	
recognition	of	the	need	to	‘let	science	be	science’,	and	indeed,	to	‘let	
creation	be	creation’.
I	 choose	 this	 as	 an	 area	 where	 Tom	 Torrance’s	 account	 of	
the	 fundamental	 relationship	 between	 theology	 and	 science	 may	
need	 some	 revision,	 but	 let	me	 end	 by	 emphasising	 again	 his	 very	
considerable,	 and	 to	 a	 large	 degree,	 pioneering	 achievement.	 It	 is	
all	 the	 greater,	 in	 my	 view,	 because	 it	 came	 from	 the	 heart	 of	 his	
own	Christian	conviction	and	experience,	 and	as	 such	was	 truly	an	
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example	of	theology	in	the	service	of	the	Church.	When	will	we	again	
see	such	a	distinguished	theologian	who	spent	nearly	ten	years	as	a	
parish	minister?
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